Avicenna's Proof from Possibility
The proof of the existence of the Necessary of Existence through Itself appears in Chapter 4 of the Physics and Metaphysics of the Ishārāt (II.4.9-15).1 Following a discussion of causation, Avicenna introduces the concepts 'possible existent' and 'necessary existent' , and submits that every existent must be either possible of existence in itself, or necessary of existence in itself (Ishārāt II.4.9).2 A thing that is possible in itself is predisposed as such to neither existence nor nonexistence. So if such a thing becomes existent, there must be something other than itself that tips the balance and renders its existence preponderant to its nonexistence. Therefore, the existence of a possible thing must be caused by another (Ishārāt II.4.10) .3 What Avicenna intends by 'cause' here is a 'metaphysical' efficient cause (that is, a cause of existence), as opposed to a 'physical' efficient cause (that is, a cause of motion).4 As such, the cause of a possible existent must coexist with its effect.5
Now, it is obvious that possible existents do actually exist. Each possible existent must be caused either by another possible existent, or by an existent necessary through itself. As the existence of the latter has yet to be demonstrated, the argument proceeds on the assumption that the cause is a possible existent. If this second possible existent is caused by yet another possible existent, which is caused by yet another possible existent, then the series of successive causes possible of existence may be either infinite or finite. The next passage (Ishārāt II.4.11), therefore, begins with the disjunctive 'either' (immā), although Avicenna here only considers the former disjunct, namely that the series is infinite (which is why, in what follows, I have replaced 'either' with 'if'). He writes:
If [the series of causes possible of existence] regresses ad infinitum, then each unit in this series will be possible in itself. The whole ( jumla) is dependent on these [units] . Therefore, it too is not necessary, but must be necessitated by another.6
The second disjunct-that the series of causes possible in themselves is finite-is omitted, as it points straightforwardly to the existence of an ultimate cause necessary through itself.7 What is deserving of consideration is only the notion that the series of causes possible of existence could regress ad infinitum, which ostensibly would leave no room for an ultimate, first cause. Both disjuncts are mentioned in the Najāt.8
Avicenna 'ought to have explained, prior to this section [Ishārāt II.4.11] , that the efficient cause cannot precede its effect in time. For if it is possible [for the cause to precede its effect in time], it would not be impossible for every possible thing to be dependent on another preceding it in time, ad infinitum. However, according to him, this is not impossible' (Sharḥ, 2, 346). The question of whether or not the series of temporally successive occurrences is beginningless is of no relevance to Avicenna's proof for the existence of the Necessary of Existence through Itself; and, in fact, the discussion centres on the concept of 'possibility' and makes no reference to 'coming-to-be' . So, as al-Rāzī adds, the precise question Avicenna needs to address is whether or not an infinite series of simultaneous causes exist. Al-Rāzī opines that this is the place in which Avicenna ought to have addressed this question, but excuses him since he returns to it in Ishārāt II.5.1-3, as we have already seen in Chapter 3 (Sharḥ, 2, 346-347). So I differ with Toby Mayer, who takes the series to be temporally ordered, and reads al-Rāzī's attempt to develop Avicenna's argument as a misreading motivated by a theological agenda ('Ibn Sīnā's Burhān' , 28 ff.). 6 Avicenna, Ishārāt, 3, 21. 7 Cf. al-Rāzī, Sharḥ, 2, 347. 8 Avicenna, Najāt, 567.
